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FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON AND CHILD WELFARE
CHRIS Z. SINHA*
How far can a public hospital go to encourage drug-using prenatal patients
to accept treatment for their addictions? Not so far as to provide law enforce-
ment with the results of the patients’ positive drug screens, if the hospital per-
formed the drug screens without the consent of the patients. In Ferguson v. City
of Charleston,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that doing so without probable cause
or search warrants runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and the Court re-
manded the case for a determination as to whether the patients had in fact con-
sented to the searches.2 The Court found that, despite the contrary reasoning of
the Fourth Circuit, the hospital’s intention to use the threat of arrest and prose-
cution to force the women into drug treatment did not bring the practice within
the ambit of the “special needs” doctrine, and so the Fourth Amendment’s pro-
hibition against searches applied.3
The final result here is a relief for privacy advocates. The specter of doctors
and other medical personnel working in concert with police to gather evidence
against women seeking prenatal care, presumably in confidence, is an unnerv-
ing one. While the hospital had developed a list of nine criteria that would trig-
ger a cocaine toxicology screen, the list was disjunctive, so that a urine screen
would be conducted if the patient presented with something as vague as “in-
complete prenatal care” or “pre-term labor of no obvious cause.” The indefinite
nature of the criteria make it clear that nearly any pregnant woman, not only
one presenting a clear indication of drug problems, could have had her privacy
invaded under the hospital’s policy.
But that such a practice could go unchecked for a period of time is perhaps
less surprising in light of an underlying case. In Whitner v. State,4 South Caro-
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1. 532 U.S. 67 (2000).
2. In Ferguson, nine women brought suit against the City of Charleston when the Medical Uni-
versity of South Carolina and the Charleston City Police Department adopted a program wherein
the hospital administered drug screening tests to certain women who sought prenatal care at the
hospital. When the program was first adopted, a positive test result could be immediately turned
over to the police and the police would then arrest the pregnant woman. The program was eventu-
ally modified so that the hospital asked any pregnant woman that tested positive for cocaine use to
choose between arrest or a drug rehabilitation program. The program itself did not address medical
treatment for the children born to women who tested positive. Id.
3. Id. at 78 (noting that the “special needs” doctrine provides for a balancing test that weighs
the individual’s privacy interest against the special need that supports the governmental intrusion).
4. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
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lina’s Supreme Court specifically held that a woman’s guilty plea to criminal
child neglect for the act of smoking crack cocaine during the third trimester of
her pregnancy was appropriate. The Court claimed that the plain rules of
statutory construction required that it read the word “child” as it appeared in
the statute5 to include “viable fetus.” The Court also reviewed decisions in the
wrongful death and feticide arenas, as well as sections of the child welfare code,
to support its construction of the term.6 While the Ferguson Court only mentions
Whitner in its second footnote, this case in fact provided the means by which
criminal complaints were lodged against many of the patients in the Ferguson
case. Thus, the legal status of the fetus is intrinsic to the Ferguson case.
These cases raise a local question: pre-Ferguson, would North Carolina law
have allowed for such a practice? The status of a fetus differs from one area of
the law to another here.7 The North Carolina Constitution has been interpreted
to exclude a fetus as a person.8 Nor will killing a fetus support a charge of man-
slaughter,9 though intentional injury to a pregnant woman resulting in harm to
the fetus can elevate the criminal charges filed.10 However, a viable fetus is a
person whose claim falls within the purview of the wrongful death statute,11 and
a fetus can take in an estate as if born.12
On the whole it seems unlikely that the Ferguson facts could have arisen in
North Carolina. Though the representatives of individuals killed in utero may
pursue wrongful death actions and children can acquire certain property rights
in utero, in the more relevant areas of North Carolina constitutional and crimi-
nal law, the courts have stopped short of declaring that a fetus is a person. If a
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Supp. 2001).
6. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779-80.
7. For an exhaustive review of the status of a fetus under North Carolina law, see Tony Hart-
soe, Person or Thing – In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina Law, 17
CAMPBELL L. REV. 169 (1995).
8. Stam v. North Carolina, 275 S.E.2d 439 (N.C. 1981) (involving a challenge to the use of pub-
lic tax dollars to fund abortions, in part on the grounds that the fetus was entitled to due process be-
fore deprivation of life). The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment and its specific finding that a fetus is not a legal “person” within the meaning of the
North Carolina Constitution. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals had reached the same con-
clusions below in Stam v. State. 267 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
9. State v. Parsons, 374 S.E.2d 123 (N.C. 1989) (involving a defendant who was indicted for
killing “a nameless living female fetus which was in the body of its mother” after a fetus was killed
in a car accident). The trial court dismissed this case for failure to allege a material element of man-
slaughter, specifically, that defendant killed a living human being, and the State’s second indictment
alleging that the defendant killed “a living human being, Kandy Renae Greer, a viable but unborn
female child” was dismissed as collaterally estopped by the first attempt. Id.
10. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2 (2001), a defendant who causes injury to a woman he
knows to be pregnant which results in the miscarriage or stillbirth of the fetus is guilty of a crime
one level elevated above that which he committed against the woman. The statute specifically ex-
cludes permitted abortions and, more significantly, acts committed by the woman herself. It appears
the Ferguson plaintiffs would not have been subject to criminal charges in North Carolina under this
statute.
11. See DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1989); see also Greer v. Parsons, 405 S.E.2d
921 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 416 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1992).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5 (2001); see also Mackie v. Mackie, 52 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. 1949) (estab-
lishing that such property rights attach 280 days before the child’s birth).
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fetus is not a person, then it follows that the drug-using pregnant woman cannot
be charged with a crime against it.
While most of us would applaud the result in Ferguson, the case most defi-
nitely raises a concern: if the woman is not criminally charged, what happens to
the resulting child? Surely we can all agree that a pregnant woman’s use of ille-
gal substances does not bode well for the child’s health--nor for the woman’s
parenting abilities. It is appropriate in these situations to involve child welfare
professionals.
In North Carolina, any person or institution suspecting that a child is
abused, neglected or dependant must report that case to the local child welfare
authority.13 Hospital personnel that conduct a proper, medically-indicated toxi-
cology screen on a newborn, then, may feel obliged under the law to report the
child’s positive test result and surrounding circumstances to the county De-
partment of Social Services, which is required to conduct an investigation into
all reports of abuse, neglect and dependency.14 North Carolina’s definition of a
neglected child is extremely broad, including a child “who does not receive
proper care, supervision, or discipline,” and “who lives in an environment inju-
rious to the juvenile’s welfare.”15 South Carolina’s definition is similarly broad.16
In either state, then, an investigation into the circumstances of a newborn
with a positive toxicology is likely to uncover additional factors that will bring
the case within the definition. At that point services can be offered to the
mother if appropriate. This was the alleged goal of the tactics employed by the
hospital staff in Ferguson, but clearly a child welfare investigation after birth of a
child does not carry quite the same coercive overtone as a threat of criminal
prosecution while a woman is still pregnant.
Should it become necessary to remove the child for its own safety, criminal
charges are still not required. Child welfare agencies file their actions in civil
rather than criminal court.17 As the trend in child welfare is toward a less puni-
tive, more family-centered, co-operative approach that can involve multiple re-
sponses,18 social work professionals view criminal court as the last forum likely
to result in abstinence from drugs and therefore better parenting. Social work-
ers as well as adherents to the Fourth Amendment can applaud the Ferguson de-
cision.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2001).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-302(a) (2001).
15. N.C. GEN .STAT. § 7B-101(15) (2001).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(2) (2001).
17. N.C.GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-101(6), -200 (Supp. 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-490(20), -736(A)
(Supp. 2001).
18. See generally Jane Waldfogel, Rethinking the Paradigm for Child Protection, 8 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 104 (1998).
